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Abstract
The election control problem asks to find a set of nodes in a social network
of voters to be the starters of a political campaign aimed at supporting a given
target candidate. When a voter is reached by the campaign it changes its opinion
on the candidates. The goal is to shape the diffusion of the campaign in such a
way that the chances of victory of the target candidate are maximized. Previous
works on this problem show that it can be approximated within a constant
ratio in several models for information diffusion and voting systems. These
works assume the full knowledge of the preferences of each voter. However,
this information is not always available since voters can be undecided or they
may not want to reveal it. Herein we relax this assumption by considering that
each voter is associated with a probability distribution over the candidates. We
propose two new models in which, when a voter is reached by a campaign, it
modifies its probability distribution according to the amount of influence it
received from its neighbors in the network. We then study the election control
problem on the new models: In the first model, under the Gap-ETH hypothesis,
election control cannot be approximated within a factor better than 1/no(1),
where n is the number of voters; in the second model the problem admits a
constant factor approximation algorithm.
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1 Introduction
Social media play a fundamental role in everyone’s life providing information, en-
tertainment, and learning. Many social media users prefer to access social network
platforms (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) before news sites as they provide a faster means
of information diffusion. As a consequence, online social networks are also exploited
as a tool to alter users’ opinions. The extent to which the opinions of an individual are
conditioned by social interactions is called social influence. It has been observed that
social influence started from a small set of individuals may generate a cascade effect
that allows the initial influence to be diffused to a large part of the network. Recently,
this capability has been used to affect the outcome of political elections. There exists
evidence of political intervention which shows the effect of social media manipulation,
for example by spreading fake news, on the elections outcome [PCR18]. A real-life
example is in recent US election where a study on the effect of social media on people
during the presidential election shows that in average ninety-two percent of American
remembered pro-Trump false news, and twenty-three percent of them remembered the
pro-Clinton fake news [AG17]. We point the reader to many other real-life examples
that have been recorded and studied [SBLS18, Kre16, BFJ+12, Fer17].
Despite the large literature on influence diffusion and on election manipulation,
there are only few studies on the problem of manipulating the outcome of a political
election by using influence diffusion in social networks. The election control problem
has been introduced by Wilder et al. and consists in selecting a subset of the nodes of
a network to be the starter of the diffusion with the aim of maximizing the chances of
victory or loosing of a target candidate [WV18]. They use the Independent Cascade
Model [KKT15] as model of diffusion and plurality as voting system. When a voter is
reached by the social influence, it changes the ranking of the target candidate by one
position. Corò et al. studied the same problem by using the Linear Threshold Model
(LTM) [KKT15] and an arbitrary scoring rule [CCDP19]. In both cases, the election
control problem can be solved with an approximation factor of 13(1 − 1/e) in the
constructive scenario and 12(1− 1/e) in the destructive one. Faliszewski et al. studied
a variant of the Linear Threshold Model with weights on the vertices on a graph in
which each node is a cluster of voters with a specific list of candidates and there is
an edge between two nodes if they differ by the ordering of a single pair of adjacent
candidates [FGKT18]. They prove that the problem of making a specific candidate
win in their model is NP -hard and fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the
number of candidates. Bredereck et al. studied the problem of manipulating the
network by bribing or adding/deleting edges in order to control the majority opinion
on a simple Linear Threshold Model where each node holds a binary opinion, each
edge has the same fixed weight, and all vertices have a threshold fixed to 1/2 [BE17].
In their work they studied the hardness and the parameterized complexity of the
manipulations problem they proposed.
In all these previous works, it is assumed that the preference list of each voter on
2
the candidates is given in input. However, this assumption is not always satisfied in
realistic scenarios. In fact, voters can be undecided on their preferences or they may
not reveal them to the manipulator. In this paper we consider a more realistic model
that takes into account the uncertainty of a voter and where the preference list of
a voter is not fully revealed. Specifically, we use an uncertain model in which the
manipulator only knows the probability distribution of the most preferred candidate
of each voter, instead of a deterministic preference list. In this model we study
the election control problem introduced in [WV18, CCDP19], that is, we look for
a bounded set of nodes to start the information diffusion in such a way that the
chances of victory of a given target candidate are maximized.
1.1 Related Work
There is a wide literature about manipulating a voting system without consider-
ing the underlying social network of the voters, e.g., swap bribery [EFS09], shift
bribery [BFNT16]; we point the reader to a recent survey [FRM16].
The study of opinion diffusion modeled as a majority dynamics has been widely
considered [ACF+15, BEEG16, BGP17]. In these models each agent has an initial
preference list and at each time step a subset of agents updates their opinions, i.e.,
their preference lists, according to some majority-based rule that depends on their
neighbors’ opinions in the network.
Modeling uncertainty in political elections has been already considered in the
literature, for example, the study of the uncertainty introduced by incomplete data
given to the problem [KL05, BHN09, XC11], or models in which candidates may
change during the election campaign [CLMM10, BRR11], or the vote of a bribed
voter may or may not be counted [CXX+18].
1.2 Roadmap
In Section 3, we introduce two new models called Probabilistic Linear Threshold
Ranking (PLTR) and Relaxed Probabilistic Linear Threshold Ranking (R-PLTR)
which use LTM for information diffusion and plurality voting as a voting system. In
both models each voter has an associated probability distribution over the candidates,
which is changed during the diffusion process according to the amount of influence
received from the neighbors. In PLTR only active voters, i.e., nodes that propagate
the influence, can change their probability distribution; in R-PLTR all voters might
change it if they have active neighbors.
In Section 4, we show that the election control problem in PLTR is at least
as hard to approximate as the well-known Densest-k-Subgraph problem [Man17].
This result implies several conditional hardness of approximation bounds for our
problem, for example it cannot be approximated within any constant factor, unless
the Unique Game Conjecture holds and it cannot be approximated to within any
polynomial factor if the Exponential Time Hypothesis holds. However, these hardness
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of approximation bounds do not hold for the election control problem in R-PLTR,
for which we can show that the problem remains NP -hard.
In Section 5, we give an algorithm for the election control problem (both construc-
tive and destructive) in R-PLTR that guarantees constant factor approximations.
This result along with the hardness results show a separation between the two new
models: the election control problem is hard to be approximated to within any
reasonable bound in PLTR but it can be approximated to within a constant by
slightly relaxing the model, i.e., in R-PLTR.
2 Background
In this section we present some notions and concepts about voting systems and
influence maximization on social networks that will be used in the design and analysis
of the algorithm.
2.1 Voting Systems
Voting systems are sets of rules that regulate all aspects of the voting process deter-
mining how election are conducted and how to determine the outcome. Social choice
theory formally defines and analyzes voting systems, studying how the combination of
individual opinions reaches a collective decision; computational social choice, instead,
is the study of the computational complexity of outcomes of voting rules to pose a
barrier against strategic manipulation in elections [CELM07, FP10, BCE+16, End17].
In this paper we focus on a single-winner voting system, plurality rule, that is
the most common used for national legislatures and presidential elections. In this
voting system each voter submits a single candidates among the candidates and a
candidate wins if it has the majority of votes (the absolute majority, i.e., 50%+1 of
votes, is not required).
2.2 Influence Maximization
Influence Maximization problem studies a social network with the goal of finding
a fixed sized subset of users that are the most influential and that can be used
to maximize the spread of information given a particular diffusion model [KKT15].
In this work we focus on the diffusion model known as Linear Threshold Model
(LTM) [KKT15]. Given a graph G = (V,E), in LTM each node v ∈ V has a threshold
tv ∈ [0, 1] sampled uniformly at random and independently from the other nodes and
each edge (u, v) ∈ E has a weight buv ∈ [0, 1] with the additional constraint that, for
each node v ∈ V , the sum of the weights of the incoming edges of v is less or equal
to 1, i.e.,
∑
(u,v)∈E buv ≤ 1. Each node can be either active, that is it spreads the
information, or inactive. With some probability, active nodes diffuse the information
to their neighbors and activate them. Let A0 be the set of nodes that are active at
the beginning of the process and let At be the set of nodes active at time t. In LTM,
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an inactive node v becomes active if the sum of the weights of the edges coming from
nodes that are active at the previous round is greater than or equal to its threshold
tv, i.e., v ∈ At if and only if v ∈ At−1 or
∑
u∈At−1:(u,v)∈E buv ≥ tv. The process has
quiesced at the first time t˜ such that the set of active nodes would not change in the
next round, i.e., time t˜ is such that At˜ = At˜+1. We define the eventual set of active
nodes as A := At˜ and the expected size of A as σ(A0), where A0 is the initial set
of active nodes. Given a budget B, the influence maximization problem consists in
computing an initial set A0 of B active nodes, called seeds, in such a way that σ(A0)
is maximum.
Given A0, computing σ(A0) is #P -hard [CYZ10], however, Kempe et al. showed
a way to compute it by using a random graph model called live-edge graphs [KKT15].
Given a graph G = (V,E), a live-edge graph is generated from G as follows: each
node v ∈ V , independently, selects at most one of its incoming edges with probability
proportional to the weight of that edge, that is edge (u, v) is selected with probability
buv, and no edge is selected with probability 1−
∑
(u,v)∈E buv. We denote by G the set
of all possible live-edge graphs that can be generated from G. Kempe et al. showed
that for any initial set of nodes A0, the distribution of the sets of active nodes in
G after LTM has quiesced starting from A0 is equal to the distribution of the sets
of nodes that are reachable from A0 in the set of live-edge graphs G. Therefore,
we can compute σ(A0) by solving a graph reachability problem in all the live-edge
graphs in G. Moreover, even if the number of graphs in G is exponential in the size
of G, by using standard Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds, they showed that a polynomial
number of Monte-Carlo simulations are enough to compute a 1±  approximation
of σ(A0) with high probability. They have also shown that σ(A0) is monotone and
submodular wrt the set of seed nodes, therefore the classical greedy hill-climbing
approach that starts with an empty solution and, for B iterations, selects a single
node that gives the maximal marginal gain on the objective function with respect
the solution computed so far guarantees a (1− 1/e)-approximation for the influence
maximization problem [NWF78].
2.3 Election Control
The use of diffusion processes to manipulate elections captures the scenario in which
a social network of voters is targeted by political campaigns. Election control can
be used to either ensure that a target candidate wins (constructive mode), or loses
(destructive mode). Wilder et al. [WV18] studied this problem under Independent
Cascade Model. They provide positive and negative results for the maximization of,
respectively, margin of victory (MoV) and probability of victory of a target candidate
w.r.t. its most voted opponent. Corò et al. [CCDP19] introduced a new model called
Linear Threshold Ranking (LTR), based on LTM, that takes into account the degree
of influence that voters exercise on each other. They show that in LTR it is possible
to achieve a constant factor approximation for MoV for any scoring rule.
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3 Election Control with Voters’ Uncertainty
We consider a non-deterministic scenario in which a set of candidates are running for
the elections and a social network of voters will decide the winner. In particular, we
take into account the inherent uncertainty of a voter and we model its decision as a
probabilistic function over the list of candidates.
3.1 Notation
Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph representing a social network of voters and
their interactions. We denote the set of m candidates running for the election as
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} and the target candidate as c? ∈ C. Each node v ∈ V has a
probability distribution over the candidates piv, where piv(ci) is the probability that v
votes for candidate ci; then for each v ∈ V we have that piv(ci) ≥ 0 for each candidate
ci and
∑m
i=1 piv(ci) = 1. Moreover, we denote by N
i
v and Nov , respectively, the sets
of incoming and outgoing neighbors for each node v ∈ V . For each candidate ci,
we assume that piv(ci) is at least a polynomial fraction of the number of voters, i.e.,
piv(ci) = Ω(1/|V |γ) for some constant γ > 0. We define the score of a candidate ci as
the expected number of votes that ci obtains from the voters, that is,
F (ci) :=
∑
v∈V
piv(ci).
3.2 PLTR Model
We introduce a variation of the Linear Threshold Model (LTM) [KKT15] called
Probabilistic Linear Threshold Ranking (PLTR). Similarly to the Linear Threshold
Ranking [CCDP19], PLTR takes into account the degree of influence that voters
exercise on each other, but considers a probability distribution over the candidates
for each voter, rather than assuming that the preference lists of the voters are known.
As in LTM, each node v has a threshold tv ∈ [0, 1]; each edge (u, v) ∈ E has a
weight buv, given in input with the graph, which models the influence of node u on v.
Moreover, the total weight of the incoming edges of each node v is
∑
u:(u,v)∈E buv ≤ 1.
We assume that the weight of each edge (u, v) is not smaller than a polynomial
fraction of the number of voters, i.e., buv = Ω(1/|V |γ) for some constant γ > 0.
Given an initial set of seed nodes S, the diffusion process proceeds as in LTM:
Inactive nodes become active if the sum of the weights of incoming edges from
active neighbors is greater than or equal to their threshold. In PLTR an active node
increases his probability of voting for the target candidate by adding the influence
coming from the active neighbors and then by normalizing to have again a probability
distribution. Formally, for each node v ∈ A, where A is the set of active nodes at the
end of LTM, the preference list piv changes as follows:
p˜iv(c?) =
piv(c?) +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
, (1)
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while for any other candidate ci 6= c? it changes to
p˜iv(ci) =
piv(ci)
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
. (2)
All inactive nodes v ∈ V \A will have p˜iv(ci) = piv(ci) for all candidates, including c?.
Then, we denote the score of a candidate ci at the end of the process as
F (ci, S) :=
∑
v∈V
p˜iv(ci).
Let us denote by G the set of all possible live-edge graphs sampled from G, then, we
can compute F (ci, S) by means of live-edge graphs used in the LTM model as
F (ci, S) :=
∑
G′∈G
FG′(ci, S) ·P(G′), (3)
where FG′(ci, S) is the score of ci in G′ ∈ G. More precisely, for ci = c? we have
FG′(c?, S)=
∑
v∈RG′(S)
piv(c?)+
∑
u∈RG′ (S)∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈RG′ (S)∩N iv buv
+
∑
v∈V \RG′(S)
piv(c?),
where RG′(S) is the set of nodes reachable from S in G′. A similar formulation can
be derived for ci 6= c?:
FG′(ci, S) =
∑
v∈RG′ (S)
piv(ci)
1 +
∑
u∈RG′ (S)∩N iv buv
.
3.3 R-PLTR Model
In Section 4, we show that the election control problem in PLTR is hard to approxi-
mate to within a polynomial fraction of the optimum (Theorem 1). However, we are
able to show that a small relaxation of the model allows us to approximate it to within
a constant factor. In the relaxed model, that we call Relaxed Probabilistic Linear
Threshold Ranking (R-PLTR), the probability distribution of a node is updated if it
has at least an active incoming neighbor, also if the node is not active itself: Every
node v ∈ V updates its probability distribution according to (1) and (2), and not
just every node v ∈ A as in PLTR. The rationale is that a voter might slightly
change its opinion about the target candidate if it receives some influence from its
active incoming neighbors even if the received influence is not enough to activate
it (thus making it propagate the information to its outgoing neighbors). Therefore,
we include this small amount of influence in the objective function. In Section 4 we
show that the election control problem in R-PLTR is still NP -hard, and in Section 5
we give an algorithm that guarantees a constant approximation ratio in this setting.
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3.4 Objective Function
In the election control problem we maximize the expected Margin of Victory (MoV)
of the target candidate w.r.t. its most voted opponent, akin to [WV18, CCDP19].
We define the MoV(S) obtained starting from S as the expected increase of the
difference between the score of c? and that of the most voted opponent. Formally, if
c and cˆ are respectively the candidates different from c? with the highest score before
and after the LTM process, the MoV is1
MoV(S) := F (c, ∅)− F (c?, ∅)− (F (cˆ, S)− F (c?, S)) . (4)
Given a budget B, the election control problem asks to find an initial set of seed
nodes S, of size at most B, that maximizes the MoV, i.e.,
arg maxS MoV(S)
s.t. |S| ≤ B.
It is worth noting that MoV can also be expressed as a function of the score
gained by candidate c? and the score lost by its most voted opponent cˆ at the end of
PLTR. We define the score gained and lost by a candidate ci as
g+(ci, S) := F (ci, S)− F (ci, ∅),
g-(ci, S) := F (ci, ∅)− F (ci, S).
Therefore, we can rewrite MoV(S) as
MoV(S) = g+(c?, S) + g-(cˆ, S)− F (cˆ, ∅) + F (c, ∅). (5)
3.5 Influencing Voters About Other Candidates
Note that it is not always sufficient to maximize the score of the target candidate to
ensure his victory, and it is easy to find counter-examples of this strategy. Moreover,
in the models in [WV18, CCDP19] it is sometimes convenient to increase the score
of a third candidate in order to make the most voted opponent w.r.t. c? lose score
and favor c?. In the following we show that in our model the best strategy is the one
that changes only the score of c?. We distinguish between three possible strategies:
• MoV1: Influencing voters about c?.
• MoV2: Influencing voters about cˆ, i.e., the most voted opponent w.r.t. c? at
the end of PLTR.
• MoV3: Influencing voters about any other candidate c.
1Like in previous papers, we prefer to use the increment in margin of victory rather than the
margin itself to have well defined approximation ratios.
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Let us now analyze the MoV of c? in these three different cases. As described in
Equation (5), a general formulation for MoV is the following
MoV(S) := g+(c?, S) + g-(cˆ, S) + ∆
= F (c?, S)− F (c?, ∅) + F (cˆ, ∅)− F (cˆ, S) + ∆,
where S is the initial set of seed nodes and ∆ is the sum of constant terms that are
not modified by the process. With some algebra, it is possible to compute the MoV
of c? in such scenarios, getting the following formulations:
•MoV1(S) =
∑
v∈A
pi(c?) +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
−
∑
v∈A
pi(c?) +
∑
v∈A
pi(cˆ)
−
∑
v∈A
pi(cˆ)
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
+ ∆
=
∑
v∈A
(1 + piv(cˆ)− piv(c?))
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
+ ∆;
•MoV2(S) =
∑
v∈A
pi(c?)
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
−
∑
v∈A
pi(c?) +
∑
v∈A
pi(cˆ)
−
∑
v∈A
pi(cˆ) +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
+ ∆
=
∑
v∈A
(piv(cˆ)− piv(c?)− 1)
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
+ ∆;
•MoV3(S) =
∑
v∈A
pi(c?)
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
−
∑
v∈A
pi(c?) +
∑
v∈A
pi(cˆ)
−
∑
v∈A
pi(cˆ)
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
+ ∆
=
∑
v∈A
(piv(cˆ)− piv(c?))
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
+ ∆.
We just need to observe that MoV1(S) ≥ MoV2(S) and that MoV1(S) ≥ MoV3(S)
to conclude that in PLTR it is always convenient to influence the voters about the
target candidate c? whenever you want to maximize the MoV of c? and you can
influence them only about one single candidate. Therefore, in the remainder of the
paper we only focus at changing the score of the target candidate c?.
Note also that the observations above hold for both PLTR and R-PLTR models.
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4 Hardness Results
In this section we provide two hardness results related to PLTR and R-PLTR. In
Theorem 1 we show that maximizing the MoV in PLTR is at least as hard to
approximate as the well-known Densest-k-subgraph problem (up to a constant factor).
This implies several conditional hardness of approximation bounds for the election
control problem. Indeed, it has been shown that the Densest-k-subgraph problem is
hard to approximate: to within any constant bound under the Unique Games with
Small Set Expansion conjecture [RS10]; to within n−1/(log logn)c , for some constant c,
under the exponential time hypothesis (ETH) [Man17]; to n−f(n) for any function
f ∈ o(1), under the Gap-ETH assumption [Man17].
In Theorem 2 we show that maximizing the MoV in R-PLTR is still NP -hard.
Theorem 1. An α-approximation to the election control problem in PLTR gives an
αβ-approximation to the Densest k-Subgraph problem, for a positive constant β < 1.
Proof. Given an undirected graph G = (V,E) and an integer k, Densest k-Subgraph
(DkS) is the problem of finding the subgraph induced by a subset of V of size k with
the highest number of edges given that k is fixed.
The reduction works as follows: Consider the PLTR problem on G, where each
undirected edge {u, v} is replaced with two directed edges (u, v) and (v, u). Let us
consider m candidates and let us assume that all nodes initially have null probability
of voting for all the candidates but one, different from c?, that we denote as cˆ.
Formally we have that, piv(cˆ) = 1 and piv(ci) = piv(c?) = 0 for each ci 6= cˆ and for
each v ∈ V . Assign to each edge (u, v) ∈ E a weight buv = 1nγ , for any fixed constant
γ ≥ 4 and n = |V |.
We show the reduction considering the problem of maximizing the score, because
in the instance considered in the reduction the MoV is exactly equal to twice the
score. In fact, the score of cˆ after PLTR starting from any initial set S is
F (cˆ, S) =
∑
v∈V
p˜iv(cˆ) =
∑
v∈V \A
piv(cˆ) +
∑
v∈A
p˜iv(cˆ)
= |V | − |A|+
∑
v∈A
1
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv
1
nγ
= |V | −
∑
v∈A
(
1− 1
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv
1
nγ
)
= |V | −
∑
v∈A
( ∑
u∈A∩N iv
1
nγ
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv
1
nγ
)
= |V | − F (c?, S),
because (
∑
u∈A∩N iv
1
nγ )/(1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv
1
nγ ) = p˜iv(c?) and piv(c?) = 0 for each v ∈ V .
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Thus, according to the definition of MoV in Equation (6), we have that
MoV(S) = |V | − (|V | − F (c?, S)− F (c?, S)) = 2F (c?, S).
To compute the expected final score of the target candidate we average its score in
all live live-edge graphs in G, according to Equation (3). In our reduction, the empty
live-edge graph G′∅ = (V, ∅) is sampled with high probability, i.e., with probability at
least 1− 1
nγ−2 , namely
P
(
G′∅
)
=
∏
v∈V
1− ∑
u∈N iv
buv
 = ∏
v∈V
(
1− |N
i
v|
nγ
)
≥
∏
v∈V
(
1− 1
nγ−1
)
=
(
1− 1
nγ−1
)n
(a)
=
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1)n−i
( −1
nγ−1
)i
=
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(−1)i
ni(γ−1)
(b)
≥
(
n
0
)
−
(
n
1
)
1
nγ−1
+
bn/2c∑
i=2
((
n
i
)
1
n2i(γ−1)
−
(
n
i+ 1
)
1
n(2i+1)(γ−1)
)
(c)
≥ 1− 1
nγ−2
where (a) follows from the binomial expansion, (b) is due to last negative term in the
left hand side that does not appear in the right hand side when n is even, and (c) is
due to (
n
i
)
1
n2i(γ−1)
≥
(
n
i+ 1
)
1
n(2i+1)(γ−1)
,
for any γ ≥ 2. Since P (G′∅) ≤ 1, then P (G′∅) = Θ(1). Moreover, ∑G′ 6=G′∅ P (G′) =
O ( 1
nγ−2
)
.
The score obtained by c? in a live-edge graph G′ starting from any initial set of
seed nodes S is
FG′(c?, S) =
∑
v∈RG′ (S)
piv(c?) +
∑
u∈RG′ (S)∩N iv
1
nγ
1 +
∑
u∈RG′ (S)∩N iv
1
nγ
= Θ
 1
nγ
∑
v∈RG′ (S)
|RG′(S) ∩N iv|
 ,
since 1 ≤ 1+∑u∈RG′ (S)∩N iv 1nγ ≤ 2 for each v ∈ RG′(S). Note that∑v∈RG′ (S) |RG′(S)∩
N iv| is equal to the number of edges of the subgraph induced by the set RG′(S) of nodes
reachable from S in G′, which is not greater than n2, and thus FG′(c?, S) = O
(
1
nγ−2
)
.
Note that in the empty live-edge graph G′∅ the set RG′∅(S) at the end of LTM is
equal to S, since the graph has no edges. Thus
FG′∅
(c?, S) =
1
nγ
·
∑
v∈S
|S ∩N iv|
1 +
∑
u∈S∩N iv
1
nγ
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and since the denominator is, again, bounded by two constants we have that
FG′∅
(c?, S) = Θ
(∑
v∈S |S ∩N iv|
nγ
)
= Θ
(
SOLDkS(S)
nγ
)
,
where SOLDkS(S) :=
∑
v∈S |S ∩N iv| is the number of edges of the subgraph induced
by S, i.e., the value of the objective function of DkS for solution S.
Thus, the expected final score of the target candidate is
F (c?, S) =
∑
G′∈G
FG′(c?, S) ·P(G′) = FG′∅(c?, S) ·P(G
′
∅) +
∑
G′ 6=G′∅
FG′(c?, S) ·P(G′).
Since FG′(c?, S) and
∑
G′ 6=G′∅ P (G
′) are in O ( 1
nγ−2
)
, then
∑
G′ 6=G′∅
FG′(c?, S) ·P(G′) = O
(
1
nγ−2
) ∑
G′ 6=G′∅
P(G′) = O
(
1
n2(γ−2)
)
= O
(
SOLDkS(S)
nγ
)
,
for any γ ≥ 4. Thus
F (c?, S) = Θ
(
SOLDkS(S)
nγ
)
·Θ(1) +O
(
SOLDkS(S)
nγ
)
which means that F (c?, S) = Θ
(
SOLDkS(S)
nγ
)
. We apply the Bachmann-Landau
definition of Θ notation: There exist three positive constants n0, β1, and β2 such
that, for all n > n0,
β1
SOLDkS(S)
nγ
≤ F (c?, S) ≤ β2SOLDkS(S)
nγ
.
Note that, in this case, the constants n0, β1, and β2 do not depend on the specific
instance.
Since the previous bounds hold for any set S we also have that β1OPTDkSnγ ≤
OPT ≤ β2OPTDkSnγ , where OPT is the value of an optimal solution for PLTR and
OPTDkS is the value of an optimal solution for DkS.
Suppose that there exists an α-approximation algorithm for PLTR, i.e., an algo-
rithm that finds a set S such that the value of its solution is MoV(S) = 2F (c?, S) ≥
α ·OPT. Then,
α
2
· β1OPTDkS
nγ
≤ α
2
·OPT ≤ F (c?, S) ≤ β2SOLDkS(S)
nγ
.
Thus SOLDkS(S) ≥ α2 β1β2OPTDkS , i.e., the solution is an αβ-approximation to DkS,
with β := β12β2 .
12
As a corollary of Theorem 1 we get the conditional hardness of approximation
bounds stated at the beginning of this section.
Theorem 2. Election control in R-PLTR is NP-hard.
Proof. We prove the hardness by reduction from Influence Maximization under LTM,
which is known to be NP -hard [KKT15].
Consider an instance ILTM = (G,B) of Influence Maximization under LTM. ILTM
is defined by a weighted graph G = (V,E,w) with weight function w : E → [0, 1] and
by a budget B. Let IR-PLTR := (G′, B) be the instance that corresponds to ILTM on
R-PLTR, defined by the same budget B and by a graph G′ = (V ′, E′, w′) that can
be built as follows:
1. Duplicate each vertex in the graph, i.e., we define the new set of nodes as
V ′ := V ∪ {v|V |+1, . . . , v2|V |}.
2. Add an edge between each vertex v ∈ V to its copy in V ′, i.e., we define the
new set of edges as E′ := E ∪ {(v1, v|V |+1), . . . , (v|V |, v2|V |)}.
3. Keep the same weight for each edge in E and we set the weights of all new
edges to 1, i.e., w′(e) = w(e) for each e ∈ E and w′(e) = 1 for each e ∈ E′ \ E.
Note that the constraint on incoming weights required by LTM is not violated
by w′.
4. Consider m candidates c?, c1, . . . , cm−1. For each v ∈ V we set piv(c?) = 1 and
piv(ci) = 0 for any other candidate i ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}. For each v ∈ V ′\V we set
piv(c?) = 0, piv(c1) = 1 and piv(ci) = 0 for any other candidate i ∈ {2, . . . ,m−1}.
Let S be the initial set of seed nodes of size B that maximizes ILTM and let A be
the set of active nodes at the end of the process. The value of the MoV obtained by
S in IR-PLTR is MoV(S) = |V |− |V \A|. Indeed, each node v ∈ V in G′ has p˜iv(c?) =
piv(c?) = 1, because the probability of voting for the target candidate remains the
same after the normalization. Moreover, each node vi ∈ V ∩A influences its duplicate
v|V |+i with probability 1 and therefore p˜iv|V |+i(c?) = (piv|V |+i(c?)+1)/2 =
1
2 . Therefore,
F (c?, ∅) = F (c1, ∅) = |V |, F (c?, S) = |V |+ 12 |A|, and F (c1, S) = |V \A|+ 12 |A|.
Let S be the initial set of seed nodes of size B that achieves the maximum in
IR-PLTR. Without loss of generality, we can assume that S ⊆ V , since we can replace
any seed node v|V |+i in V ′ \V with its corresponding node vi in V without decreasing
the objective function. If A is the set of active nodes at the end of the process, then
by using similar arguments as before, we can prove that MoV(S) = |V | − |V \ A|.
Let us assume that S does not maximize ILTM, then, S would also not maximize
IR-PLTR, which is a contradiction since S is an optimal solution for IR-PLTR.
We can prove the NP -hardness for the case of maximizing the score by using the
same arguments. In fact, notice that maximizing the score of c?, i.e., F (c?, S) =
|V |+ 12 |A|, is exactly equivalent to maximize the cardinality of the active nodes in
LTM.
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5 Approximation Results
In this section we give a constant factor approximation algorithm for the election
control problem in R-PLTR. We first show that we can approximate the optimal
MoV to within a constant factor by optimizing the increment in the score of candidate
c?. In detail, we show that given two solutions S∗ and S∗∗ that maximize g+(c?, S∗)
and MoV(S) respectively, then MoV(S∗) ≥ 13MoV(S∗∗). Indeed, we show a more
general statement that is: If a solution S approximates g+(c?, S∗) within a factor α,
then MoV(S) ≥ α3MoV(S∗∗).
Then we show that a simple greedy hill-climbing approach gives a constant factor
approximation to the problem of maximizing g+(c?, S), where the constant is 12(1− 1e ).
By combining the two results, we obtain an 16(1− 1e )-approximation algorithm for
the election control problem in R-PLTR.
5.1 Score Approximates Margin of Victory
In the following we show that if there exists an approximation algorithm to the
problem of maximizing the increment in score of the target candidate, then, we can
achieve an approximation to the original problem of maximizing its MoV, at the cost
of an extra constant approximation factor.
Next theorem generalizes [WV18, Theorem 5.2] as it holds for any scoring rule
and for any model in which we have the ability to change only the position of a target
candidate c? in the lists of a subset of voters and the increment in score of c? is at
least equal to the decrement in scoring of the other candidates.
Theorem 3. An α-approximation algorithm for the problem of maximizing the
increment in score of a target candidate gives an α3 -approximation to the election
control problem.
Proof. Let us consider S and S∗ as two solutions for the problem of maximizing
the MoV for a target candidate c?, with S∗ as the optimal solution to this problem.
These solutions arbitrarily select a subset of voters and modify their preference list
changing the score of c?.
Let us fix c and cˆ, respectively, as the candidates different from c? with the
highest score before and after the solution S is applied. If we do not consider the gain
given by the score lost by the most voted opponent and we assume there exists an
α-approximation to the problem of maximizing the increment in score of the target
candidate, we have that
MoV(S) = g+(c?, S) + g-(cˆ, S)− F (cˆ) + F (c)
≥ αg+(c?, S∗)− F (cˆ) + F (c)
≥ α
3
[g+(c?, S
∗) + g-(c¯, S∗) + g-(cˆ, S∗)]− F (cˆ) + F (c),
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Algorithm 1 Greedy
Require: Social graph G = (V,E); Budget B
1: Gˆ = (G,w) . Weighted graph Gˆ
2: S = ∅
3: while |S| ≤ B do
4: v = arg maxu∈V \S σw(S ∪ {u})− σw(S)
5: S = S ∪ {v}
6: return S
where the last inequality holds because g+(c?, S) ≥ g-(ci, S) for any solution S and
candidate ci due to the fact that the solution S is able to modify only the score of the
candidate c?, increasing it, while the score of all the other candidates is decreased,
and the increment in score to c∗ is equal to the sum of the decrement in score of all
the other candidates. Since F (cˆ) ≤ F (c), we have that
MoV(S) ≥ α
3
[g+(c?, S
∗) + g-(c¯, S∗) + g-(cˆ, S∗)− F (cˆ) + F (c)]
=
α
3
[g+(c?, S
∗) + g-(c¯, S∗) + F (c)− F (c¯) + g-(cˆ, S∗)− F (cˆ) + F (c¯)]
=
α
3
[MoV(S∗) + g-(cˆ, S∗)− F (cˆ) + F (c¯)],
where c¯ is the candidate with the highest score after the solution S∗ is applied. By
definition of c¯ we have that F (c¯, S∗) ≥ F (cˆ, S∗), which implies that
g-(c¯, S∗)− g-(cˆ, S∗) = F (c¯)− F (c¯, S∗)− F (cˆ) + F (cˆ, S∗)
≤ F (c¯)− F (cˆ).
Thus, g-(cˆ, S∗)− F (cˆ) + F (c¯) ≥ 0 and we can conclude that
MoV(S) ≥ α
3
MoV(S∗).
5.2 Approximating the Score in R-PLTR
In the following we show how to achieve a constant factor approximation to the
problem of maximizing the MoV in R-PLTR by maximizing the increment in score of
a target candidate. The idea is to reduce the problem to an instance of the weighted
version of LTM for which we are able to obtain a 1− 1/e approximation.
This natural extension of the LTM, presented in [KKT15], associates to each node
a non-negative weight (w : V → R+) that captures the importance of activating that
node. The objective function is then to find the initial seed set in order to maximize
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the sum of the weights of the active nodes at the end of the process, i.e., finding
arg max
S
σw(S) = E
[∑
v∈A
w(v)
]
.
A simple hill-climbing greedy algorithm achieves a constant factor approximation
of 1 − 1/e if the weights are polynomial in the number of nodes of the graph and
the number of live-edge graph samples is polynomially large in the weights [KKT15].
It is still an open question how well the value of σw(S) can be approximated for an
influence model with arbitrary node weights: Intuitively, if a node has an exponentially
small probability of being sampled in the live-edge graph associated with a high
weight, then a polynomial number of samples would not be enough to consider it in
the solution with non-negligible probability.
We exploit such result to approximate the MoV, reducing the problem of max-
imizing the score to that of maximizing σw(S) in the weighted LTM. We define a
new graph Gˆ with the same sets of nodes and edges of G. Then, we assign a weight
to each node v ∈ V equal to w(v) := ∑u∈Nov bvu(1− piu(c?)). Note that we are able
to correctly approximate the value of σw(S) using such weights since the weight on
each edge and the probability of not voting c? are at least a polynomial fraction
w.r.t. |V |, then the weight on each node in Gˆ is still bounded by a polynomial and,
consequently, also the ratio between any two weights. By applying a multiplicative
form of the Chernoff bound we can get a 1±  approximation of σw(S), with high
probability [KKT15, Proposition 4.1].
Then, we can use a simple hill-climbing greedy to maximize the influence on Gˆ.
The hill-climbing algorithm starts with an empty set of seed nodes S and adds to
it, in each of B rounds, the node v with maximal marginal gain w.r.t. the solution
computed so far.
Theorem 4. A greedy hill-climbing algorithm guarantees a 16(1− 1e )-approximation
factor to election control in R-PLTR.
Proof. We first prove that a simple hill-climbing greed algorithm achieves an 12(1− 1e )
approximation factor to the problem of maximizing the increment in score of the
target candidate c? in R-PLTR. Let S and S? respectively be the set of initial seed
nodes found by the greedy algorithm and the optimal one. We have that
g+(c?, S) = F (c?, S)− F (c?)
=
∑
v∈V
piv(c?) +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
−
∑
v∈V
piv(c?)
=
∑
v∈V
(1− piv(c?))
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
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and, since the denominator is at most 2, that
g+(c?, S) ≥ 1
2
∑
v∈V
(1− piv(c?))
∑
u∈A∩N iv
buv =
1
2
∑
u∈A
∑
v∈Nou
buv(1− piv(c?))
where A is the set of active nodes at the end of the process.
Note that
∑
u∈A
∑
v∈Nou buv(1− piv(c?)) is exactly the objective function that the
greedy algorithm maximizes. Hence, using the result by Kempe et al. [KKT15], we
know that ∑
u∈A
∑
v∈Nou
buv(1− piv(c?)) ≥ (1− 1/e)
∑
u∈A?
∑
v∈Nou
buv(1− piv(c?)),
where A? is the set of active nodes at the end of the process starting from S?.
Therefore
g+(c?, S) ≥ 1
2
(1− 1/e) g+(c?, S?)
since
g+(c?, S
?) =
∑
v∈V
(1− piv(c?))
∑
u∈A?∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A?∩N iv buv
≤
∑
v∈V
(1− piv(c?))
∑
u∈A?∩N iv
buv
=
∑
u∈A?
∑
v∈Nou
buv(1− piv(c?)),
where the inequality is due to the fact that the denominator in all the terms of
g+(c?, S
?) is at least 1. Thus, the greedy algorithm achieves a 12
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation
to the maximum increment in score. Using Theorem 3 we get a 16
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation
ratio for the MoV.
5.3 Destructive Election Control in R-PLTR
In this section we focus on the destructive election control problem. The model is
similar to the constructive one, defined in Section 3. For each node v ∈ A, where A
is the set of active nodes at the end of LTM, the preference list piv in the destructive
case changes as follows:
p˜iv(c?) =
piv(c?)
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
;
p˜iv(ci) =
piv(ci) +
1
m−1
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
, for each ci 6= c?.
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As for the MoVD of c?, it is defined as
MoVD(S) := F (cˆ, S)− F (c?, S)− (F (c, ∅)− F (c?, ∅))
= F (c?, ∅)− F (c?, S) + F (cˆ, S)− F (cˆ, ∅) + ∆,
where S is the initial set of seed nodes and ∆ = F (cˆ, ∅)−F (c, ∅) is the sum of constant
terms that are not modified by the process. Equivalently, using the preference lists
modified by the process, MoVD(S) can be also written as
MoVD(S) =
∑
v∈A
(piv(c?) + piv(cˆ) +
1
m−1)
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
.
Similarly to the constructive case, we define a new graph Gˆ with the same sets
of nodes and edges of G. Then, we assign a weight to each node v ∈ V equal to
w(v) :=
∑
u∈Nov bvupiu(c?).
Theorem 5. A greedy hill-climbing algorithm guarantees a 14(1− 1e )-approximation
factor to the destructive election control in R-PLTR.
Proof. We first prove that a simple hill-climbing greed algorithm achieves an 12(1− 1e )
approximation factor to the problem of maximizing the decrease in score of the target
candidate c? in R-PLTR. Let S and S? respectively be the set of initial seed nodes
found by the greedy algorithm and the optimal one. Let g−D(c?, S) be the decrease in
score of candidate c? with solution S, i.e., g−D(c?, S) = F (c?, ∅)− F (c?, S). Let A be
the set of active nodes at the end of the process; then we have that
g−D(c?, S) =
∑
v∈V
piv(c?)
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A∩N iv buv
and, since the denominator is at most 2, that
g−D(c?, S) ≥
1
2
∑
v∈V
piv(c?) ∑
u∈A∩N iv
buv

=
1
2
∑
u∈A
∑
v∈Nou
piv(c?) · buv.
Note that
∑
u∈A
∑
v∈Nou piv(c?) · buv is exactly the objective function of the greedy
Algorithm that maximizes the weighted-LTM for Gˆ. Hence, using the result by
Kempe et al. [KKT15], we know that∑
u∈A
∑
v∈Nou
buv piv(c?) ≥
(
1− 1
e
) ∑
u∈A?
∑
v∈Nou
buvpiv(c?),
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where A? is the optimal set of active nodes, i.e., the set of active nodes at the end
process starting from S? (S? the optimal solution for the weighted-LTM).
Therefore
g−D(c?, S) ≥
1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
g−D(c?, S
?)
because
g−D(c?, S
?) =
∑
v∈V
piv(c?)
∑
u∈A?∩N iv buv
1 +
∑
u∈A?∩N iv buv
≤
∑
v∈V
piv(c?)
∑
u∈A?∩N iv
buv =
∑
u∈A?
∑
v∈Nou
buv piv(c?),
where the inequality is due to the fact that the denominator in all the terms of
g−D(c?, S
?) is at least 1. Thus we achieve a 12
(
1− 1e
)
-approximation to the maximum
increment in score.
Let us fix c and cˆ, respectively, as the candidates different from c? with the highest
score before and after the solution S is applied; let c¯ be the most voted opponent
after the optimal solution S∗ is applied. Then we have that
MoV(S) = g−D(c?, S) + g
+
D(cˆ, S) + F (cˆ, ∅)− F (c, ∅)
≥
(
1− 1
e
)
g−D(c?, S∗) + g+D(cˆ, S) + F (cˆ, ∅)− F (c, ∅)
≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)[
g−D(c?, S∗) + g+D(c¯, S∗) + g+D(cˆ, S) + F (cˆ, ∅)− F (c, ∅)
]
=
1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
[g−D(c?, S∗) + g+D(c¯, S∗) + g+D(cˆ, S) + F (cˆ, ∅)− F (c, ∅)
+ F (c¯, ∅)− F (c¯, ∅)]
=
1
2
(
1− 1
e
)[
MoV(S∗) + g+D(cˆ, S) + F (cˆ, ∅)− F (c¯, ∅)
]
≥ 1
2
(
1− 1
e
)
MoV(S∗),
where the last inequality holds since, by definition of c¯ and cˆ, we have that g+D(cˆ, S) +
F (cˆ, ∅) ≥ g+D(c¯, S∗) + F (c¯, ∅).
6 Simulations
We simulate our model on two real-world social networks2 on which political cam-
paigning messages could spread:
2The datasets are taken from http://networkrepository.com/
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• polbooks : an undirected network with 105 nodes and 882 edges where nodes are
political books and edges represent co-purchasing behavior; nodes are labeled
as “liberal,” “conservative,” or “neutral.”
• polblogs: a directed network with 1,224 nodes and 19,025 edges where nodes
are web blogs about US politics and edges hyperlinks connecting them; nodes
are labeled as “liberal” or “conservative.”
The number of candidates in our simulations is based on the ground truth of the
datasets; as mentioned earlier, polbooks has three clusters and polblogs has two clusters
based on different US political parties. We set the probability of each node v to vote
for, say, a “liberal” candidate proportionally to the number of neighbors labeled as
“liberal,” i.e., we set piv(c) =
|Nv∩B|
|Nv | where c is the “liberal” candidate, B is the set of
nodes labeled as “liberal,” and Nv is the set of neighbors of v. For each node v we
sampled the “non-incoming influence weight” b¯v uniformly at random in [0, 1] and
assigned the remaining influence weight uniformly among its incoming neighbors, i.e.,
we assigned to each edge (u, v) a weight buv = 1−b¯v|N iv | .
In our simulations we run our Greedy algorithm for the election control problem
in R-PLTR. Then, we measure the score and the Margin of Victory (MoV) of each
candidate using as starting seed nodes the ones found by the algorithm both in
PLTR and in R-PLTR. We run the simulation considering each different candidate
as the target one to cover multiple scenarios, considering as budget values the ones in
{0, 1, 5, 10}. Then, as baseline to compare, we also considered as seed nodes the most
influential ones, i.e., the nodes selected by Greedy to solve the standard Influence
Maximization problem.
For the implementation, we used .Net framework 4.6.2 and C# programming
language. We have implemented five different classes for managing the graph, the
LTM process, the PLTR process, and a GUI. We execute the simulations on a system
with the following specifications: CPU Intel Core i7-6700HQ 2.6 GHz, with 4×32 KB
8-way L1 (data and inst) cache, and 4× 256 KB 4-way L2 cache, and 6 MB 12-way
L3 cache, RAM 16G DDR4. Each simulation has a running time of approximately
40 seconds for poolbooks and 140 minutes for polblogs.
The results relative to the scores are shown in Figures 1 and 2. As expected, the
effect of our algorithm in R-PLTR is amplified compared to PLTR, since it affects
a greater number of voters. Taking as example the “liberal” candidate in polbooks,
we need a budget B = 5 to make it overtake the “conservative” candidate in PLTR,
while a budget B = 1 is enough in R-PLTR (see Figure 1, left column); in polblogs,
instead, we are not able to make the “liberal” candidate win in PLTR with budget
B = 10, but it is enough a budget B = 5 to make it overtake the “conservative”
candidate in R-PLTR.
The results relative to MoV are presented in Figure 3. We can note that, as a
general trend, candidates with lower probability of winning, are the most affected by
the influence generated by the seed nodes selected by our algorithm both in PLTR
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Figure 1: Candidates’ scores in polbooks in PLTR (plots on the top) and R-PLTR
(plots on the bottom), considering as target candidate the “liberal” (left), the “conser-
vative” (middle), and the “neutral” (right).
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Figure 2: Candidates’ scores in polblogs in PLTR (plots on the left) and R-PLTR
(plots on the right), considering as target candidate the “liberal” (left) and the
“conservative” (right).
and R-PLTR. The “neutral” and “liberal” candidates, respectively last and second
last voted, have the higher MoV in polbooks (see Figure 3, on the left), while the
“liberal” candidate, which was losing the elections, has the higher MoV in polblogs
(see Figure 3, on the right).
Finally, in Figure 4 we present the difference between the MoV calculated by
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Figure 3: The MoV calculated using the presented algorithm for polbooks (left)
polblogs (right), both in PLTR (dashed line) and R-PLTR (solid line), considering
as target candidate the “liberal” (blue line), the “conservative” (red line), and the
“neutral” (grey line).
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Figure 4: Difference between MoV obtained using our greedy algorithm and MoV
obtained using the standard greedy algorithm for Influence Maximization problem.
Values greater than 0 are when our algorithm performs better than the simple Greedy
for Influence Maximization.
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our algorithm and the MoV calculated using the greedy algorithm for the Influence
Maximization problem. The simulations show that our algorithm outperforms the
standard Greedy algorithm, as expected. The only scenario in which our algorithm
performs worse is that in which we influence, with low budget, the already winning
candidate (see Figure 4, on the left, red lines). The reason why our algorithm works
better than a simple Greedy is that it looks for seeds that will influence “critical”
voters, i.e., voters on which the influence will have more impact on the global score
of the candidates, while the simple Greedy algorithm just looks for influential voters,
independently from their initial opinion.
7 Conclusion
Influencing elections by means of social networks is a major issue in modern society
and understanding this phenomenon is of crucial importance in order to prevent
an attacker to control a large part of the votes. Our results constitute a first step
towards a realistic modeling of the use of social influence to control elections. We
proposed two new models that take into account the voter’s uncertainty or the fact
that they might partially hide their preference to a manipulator. In one model
the election control problem cannot be approximated within any reasonable bound,
under some computational complexity hypothesis. For the other model we provided
approximation algorithms that guarantee a constant approximation ratio both in the
constructive and in the destructive scenarios.
The results in this paper open several research directions. We plan to study the
approximability of the election control problem in a variant of R-PLTR in which
there are multiple campaigns that affects voters’ opinion on different candidates. It is
also worth to model voters’ uncertainty in different voting systems like, for example,
general scoring rules and study the approximation of the election control problem in
these cases. Finally, it would be interesting to consider uncertainty models also for
the diffusion process, for example, in robust influence maximization the weights on
the edges are not given in input but only their probability distribution is known.
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